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The United States and the Soviet Union came out of World War 
II ae the two most powerful countries in the world. Allied in the 
war by the need to defeat Hitler's Germany, not by choice, they 
discovered by the end of the War that they had many points of 
conflict. The main points of conflict at the end of the war were 
over the future of defeated Germany and the Soviet Union's position 
in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union and the United Stated have 
been the two primary actors, superpowers, on the world scene since 
1945. Though the two countries have not faced each other in direct 
military conflict, their relationship has usually been less than 
amicable. The relationship between the United States and the 
Soviet Union since the early 1950s, has been described as a Cold 
War. There relationship has seen its low points; the 1948 Berlin 
Crisis, and 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, but the relationship has 
also seen some higher points such as the detente of the early 
1970s. The relationship may be entering a new phase today in the 
1990s. Since Mikhail S. Gorbachev took over the leadership of the 
Soviet Union, it has gone through many internal and external 
changes. And in the six years since Gorbachev came to power, the 
relationship of the Soviet Union and the United States has also 
changed, towards bettor relations. This improvement of relations 
can be seen by their cooperation in the Persian Gulf Crisis. But 
with the start of the Persian Gulf War, the relationship between 
the U.S. and the Soviet Union was put under strain. The decision 
United States and itn coalition partners to use force, conflicted 
with the Soviet position to try to find a peaceful solution. The
internal problem in the Soviet Union have also caused some 
disturbances in the relationship. In the future is the 
relationship going to keep improving as it has over the last few 
years?. Or is their relationship reached its peak somewhere 
between allies and Cold Warriors? Or will their relationship 
return to a state of Cold War?
The future of the U.S.-Soviet relationship will be one aspect 
considered in this paper. This paper will examine the relationship 
of the Soviet Union and the United States since the end of World 
War II to their present day relationship. It will focus on the 
crucial periods: the early post-war years and the beginlng of the 
Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis , detente, and arms control. 
This paper will pay particular close attention the changes in their 
relationship since Gorbachev came to power in 1985 and their 
present day situation.
Immediate Post-War Years
Even though the United States and the Soviet Union were allies 
there was a strain in their relationship even before the war ended. 
At the Potsdam Conference held from July 17 to August 2, 1945, the 
meeting of U.S. President Harry S. Truman, Great Britain's Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill and Soviet General Secretary Joseph 
Stalin. The signs of disintegration of the wartime alliance were 
evident. The conference was mainly concerned with administration 
of Germany and the question of German borders.(Bark 50) The 
question of German boundaries was one of the main sticking points. 
When Germany was divided, German territory east of the Order River
The land wasand Western Neisse River went to Poland, 
compensation, or so Stalin insisted, for the eastern part of Poland 
seised by the Soviet Union in 1939 under the Hitler-Stalin 
Pact.(Bark 23) In the fall and Winter of 1944-45 the Soviet Army 
had control of this region up to the Western Neisse and lower Order 
rivers. The Communist-organ!zed Polish Lublin government swept in 
behind the Soviet Army and this became Polish territory. Churchill 
and Truman believed the Soviet government had violated the early 
Yalta agreement, in which the boundary of Poland and Germany would 
be the Order and Eastern Neisse rivers. Stalin stated that it was 
impossible to upset the present state of affairs. This meant that 
all Germans living east of the Order and Western Neisse rivers, 
about 8 and a half million people, were subject to expulsion into 
what remained of Germany by the Polish regime.(Bark 51)
The wartime allies disagreed over the boundaries of Germany. 
The United States and Britain were upset at the fact that Stalin 
was giving part of Germany to a Communist Polish regime, to repay 
it for land that the Soviet Union had taken from Poland, under the 
Stalin-Hitier pact. The leaders of Britain and the United States 
did not think it was proper to take land from Germany and give this 
land to Poland, for land seized from Poland by the Soviet Union. 
The fact that Poland now had a Communist regime was another reason 
for British and American leaders to be upset over the land 
transfer. Stalin on the other hand believed it was in his power to 
help get this land. Germany had started the war, and as the 
defeated country, they were at the mercy of the victors. It helped
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that the Rad Army had liberatedthis area. The question of the 
German boundaries was a major point of conflict but it was not the
only one.
Thera were also disagreements over reparations from Germany
i  m
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and the Soviet Union's control over Eastern Europe. The Soviet 
leaders insisted that its claim at the Yalta Conference of $10 
billion of reparations from the Western zones must be settled first 
before any agreements could be made on economic unity of 
Germany.(Deighton 45r>) The allies could not agree on how 
reparations should bo collected, and it was finally decided that 
each zone of occupation should be treated wholly separate for the 
purpose of reparation.';. (Bark 54) In addition the Soviet Union was 
to receive 25% of the industrial equipment removed from the Western 
zones.(Ulam-Rivals 75) This was one of the first steps in the 
division of Germany between the Soviet Union and the Western 
allies, the U.S., Britain and France. The Western Allies, 
especially the United States and Britain were upset at Soviet 
plundering of German industry. The Soviets uprooted much of 
Germany industry and moved it to the Soviet Union. The United 
States was not pleased at the mass removal of Germany industry. 
But Soviet leaders believed it was completely acceptable. Much of 
Soviet industry had been destroyed by the German invasion, so why 
shouldn't Germany pay the Soviet Union back? Discord at Potsdam 
also developed over the reconstitution of the Polish government, 
and the heavy-handedness of Soviet rule in Bulgarian and Romania. 
Soviet leader Joseph Stalin asserted " that the Bulgarians,
Romanians* ect., now had their own democratic governments and it 
would be inappropriate for the conferences to interfere with the 
affairs of the nations.M (Ulam-Rivals 73) The Potsdam Conference 
demonstrated that the Soviet Union and the United States had 
contradictory and incompatible interests in Germany and Eastern 
Europe, and different methods of trying to achieve these interests. 
Germany and Eastern Europe would become the two main areas of 
disagreement between the United States and the Soviet Union in the 
immediate post-war years.
The wartime alliance between the United States and Soviet 
Union was beginning to breakdown. One of the reasons for this 
breakdown was that they had different ideas of what a post-War 
Europe should look like. The Soviet Union's biggest concern was to 
make sure that they would not be invaded from the West again. This 
was one of the main reasons the Soviet leaders exerted their 
control over Eastern Europe and the reason the Soviet leaders 
wanted a weak Germany. The United States leaders biggest concern 
after the war was to get Europe back on sound economic footing. 
The United States needed European markets for their products and 
believed an economically weak Europe would hurt the economy of the 
United States. These post-War objectives of the Soviet Union and 
the United States were both misread by the other side.
The United States, its people and its leaders have an 
extremely strong attachment to democratic governments. They did 
not like the Soviet Union taking over Eastern Europe and inserting 
Communist control. The leaders of the United States did not see
Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe as the Soviet Union trying to 
gain security* but as the spread of international Communism* In 
Western Europe the Soviet Union did not see American aid as the 
United States trying to help out their allies but as the spread of 
American capitalism. The deterioration of the U.S.-Soviet 
relationship was present in Germany.
The Soviet Union and the United States were not able to come 
to an agreement on a unified Germany after the Second World War, 
and this lead to the establishment of two separate Germanies. The 
original division of Germany was worked out in 1944 by the European 
Advisory Commission, consisting of the Soviet Union, the United 
States and Britain. Germany was divided into three zones; a 
Soviet, American and British. A French zone was added later. 
These zones were not meant to be permanent. But the Soviet Union 
and the Western allies could not agree on what should be done with 
Germany. With respect to a leader, Stalin would not accept any 
German government favored by the Western allies and the Western 
allies rejected the form acceptable to Stalin. The Soviet leaders 
and the Western leaders had different views of what a future 
Germany would be like. The Soviet leaders wanted a Germany that 
was Communist or at least friendly to the Soviet Union. And the 
Western leaders wanted a Germany that would be part of Western 
Europe and economically strong. These different ideas of what 
Germany should be, helped lead to a quick drifting apart in the 
relationship of the Western allies and the Soviet Union. Winston 
Churchill 's famous "j ron curtain" speech in Fulton Missouri on
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March 5, 1946, demonstrates this fact. Churchill stated;
An iron curtain is drawn up upon their (Soviet Union's) front. 
We do not know what is going on behind. There seems little 
doubt that the whole of the regions east of the line Lubeck- 
Trieste-Corfu will soon be in their hands”(Pounds 4)
The relationship between the United States and the Soviet 
Union quickly deteriorated between the period of 1^45-1947. The 
United States failure to come to terms with the jviet Union on 
Germany and what it perceived as Soviet aggression in Eastern 
Europe led the U.S. to believe that the Soviet Union was a hostile 
expansionist country. This belief led to the implementation of the 
Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. Starting with Poland before 
the end of the war, the Soviet Union began to gain control or, 
Sovietize, all of Eastern Europe. The control of Eastern Europe 
was extremely important to the Soviet Union. The leaders of the 
Soviet Union felt, their country desired neighbors on their western 
front that were friendly to the Soviet Union. The Soviet leaders 
could remember quite vividly attacks from the West in 1914 and 1941 
and they wanted to make sure this would not happen again. Stalin 
wanted to eliminate all Western influence from Eastern Europe and 
concomitantly establish Communist control.(Rubinstein 210) In 
1945, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky, in brutal 
from, compelled the King of Romania to appoint a Communist- 
dominated government. Also in 1945 in Yugoslavia the compromise 
between the royalist regime and Tito's Communists became dominated 
by Tito.(Ulam-Expansion and Coexistence 379) In Poland Communist 
manipulations of the general elections in January 1947, helped to
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convince the United States, that the Soviet leaders had no 
intentions of permitting free elections as promised at Yalta and 
Potsdam. (Rubinstein 213) The United States and the Western allies 
were unable or unwilling to risk another war, to oppose Soviet 
methods of resettlement:, plunder, expulsion and annexation by which 
Stalin and the Czech, Polish, Hungarian and Eastern German 
Communists were installing their rule in Eastern Europe.(Bark 54) 
At the Foreign Minister*s Conference 1 1947 the question of free 
elections in Bulgaria, Poland and Romania, plagued the discussion 
between the Soviet Union and the Western allies. In February 1948, 
with a coup d' etat in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union gained 
dominance there; their control over Eastern Europe was now 
complete.(Rubinstein 240) Soviet inspired action in Czechoslovakia 
dispelled virtually all remaining illusions in the United States 
and Western Europe concerning Soviet intentions.(Rubinstein 240) 
At the end of World War II there was still hope, at least in 
the United States that the wartime alliance between the Soviet 
Union and the United States could continue. In the Summer of 1945, 
President Truman and most Americans wanted to trust Stalin and 
believed that if he was not provoked the wartime alliance could 
stay intact.(Bark 50) In May 1945, Truman sent Harry Hopkins to 
Moscow to seek a detente with Stalin. Hopkins acquiescence on the 
question of Poland, led to the Soviet Union to their own 
concession; they dropped their objection to the American plan for 
the voting procedure in the Security Council of the United 
Nations.(Ulam-Expansion and Coexistence 384-6) The United States
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leaders were willing to give it try to keep their relationship with 
the Soviet Union together* but there were too many disagreements 
between the two countries. The United Nations was one of these 
disagreements.
The formation of the United Nations was a preoccupation of the 
United States. The U.S. had a feeling of quilt over their 
abstention from the League of Nations and believed this help lead 
to the war.(Ulam-RivaIs 16) The United States thought that the 
Soviet Union's cooperation in setting up the United Nations as the 
key to success of the organization. They be. ved that no 
international organization could preserve peace without the Soviet 
Union. The United States leaders also hoped that the U.N. would 
somehow "domesticate” the Soviet Union and assimilate the goals of 
the Soviet Union, if not its aspirations to those of Western 
democracies.(Ulam-Rivals 17)
But just as the Soviet Union and the United States had 
different objectives on Germany and Eastern Europe, they also had 
different ideas on the U.N. While the United States hoped that the 
United Nations would be a grand organization that would preserve 
peace and democracy throughout the world, the Soviet leaders did 
not put much faith in the organization. The Soviets from the 
begining thought it was at best a facade for covering up the 
domination of the world by the great powers, mainly the Soviet 
Union and the United States.(Ulam-Expansion and Coexistence 412) 
Stalin himself had very little faith in the United Nations. He 
stated
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Can one trust that the role of the United Nations will be 
sufficiently effective?... (It) will be effective if the 
Great Powers that carried on their shoulder the main burden 
against Hitlerite Germany will act afterward in a spirit of 
unity and collaboration. It will not be effective if this 
necessary condition is absent.(Ulam-Expansion and 
Coexistence 412)
Although Stalin put little faith in the U.N. ; he used the American 
preoccupation with it to bargain indirectly for American 
concessions, especially on Poland.(Ulam-Rivals 38) The United 
Nations was just one of the points of conflict between the two 
countries after the war. The disagreements between the United 
States and the Soviet Union and the disintegration of their 
relationship finally caused the United States to take some type of 
action. The leaders of the United States believed that the Soviet 
Union was going to far. The Soviet Union had already gained 
control in Eastern Europe and they would not cooperate on Germany 
and the United Nations. The first such actions took the form of 
the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.
Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan 
The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, implemented in 
1947, were adopted with the underlying beliefs that the Soviet 
Union was continuing to display expansionist ambitions which the 
United Nations could not stop, that direct negotiations with the 
Soviet Union was hopeless, and that the advance of Communism must 
be stopped by an active policy of the United States.(Ulam-Rivals 
121) The Truman Doc trine and the Marshall Plan along with the 
overall policy of containment of the Soviet Union were influenced 
by George Kennan, director of Policy Planning Staff in the State
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Department. Kennan in his influential article under the pseudonym, 
X, in foreigaACfaiTB, tried to show that the Soviet government was 
inherently expansionist and that there might well be war or 
Communist domination in Europe unless the U.S. took clear action to 
contain the Soviet Union.(Bark 150) Kennan believed the way to 
contain the Soviet Union was to build countervailing centers of 
power along the periphery of the Soviet Union, so that it could not 
expand. These assumptions helped to shape the Truman Doctrine and 
the Marshall Plan.
The Truman Doctrine stated, "it must be the policy of the 
United States to support free peoples who are resisting subjugation 
by armed minorities or by outside pressures."(Ulam-Rivals 125) The 
Truman Doctrine was meant specifically for Greece, which was 
fighting internal subversion, assisted by its Communist neighbors 
and Turkey, to help them fight off Soviet pressure. The Truman 
Doctrine was formulated in anti-Communist rhetoric and to be 
applied world wide, it was hoped that in this format it would be 
able to gain public support. It may have been better for the 
United States in the long if the U.S. leaders had stated the Truman 
Doctrine was meant to keep Greece and Turkey from falling under 
Communist control, instead of international Communism, so the 
United States would not rush in every time Communism threatened a 
country anywhere in the world.
The Marshall Plan was designed to restore economic well-being 
to Europe, remedy the immediate shortages of essential commodities 
and help to expand industrial and agricultural production.(Ulam-
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Rivals 129) It was hoped that an economically strong Europe would 
be able to stand up to Communist domination; without it, it was 
feared that Italy or oven France could possible fall to Communism. 
The United States believed it was desirable to offer aid from the 
Marshall Plan to the Soviet Union as a show of good will, though 
U.S. leaders did not expect the Soviet Union would accept it. The 
Soviet leaders were intrigued by the plan but could not afford to 
disclose the information about its economy, standard of living or 
production norms.(Ulam- Rivals 129) To the Soviet Union, the 
Marshall Plan, seemed to entail an all-encompassing program of 
integration of various national economies. The Soviet leaders 
also perceived the plan as a way to promote economic and hence 
political expansion of American influence.(Rubinstein 214) The 
Truman doctrine and the Soviet refusal to accept aid from the 
Marshall Plan accelerated U.S.-Soviet estrangement, which came to 
a head in Berlin in 1948.
Berlin Crisis 1948
Since the end of the War the Western zones of Germany, the 
American, British and French, were becoming closer together and 
estranged from the Soviet zone. The Soviet Union was installing 
Communist control in its zone, Stalin got rid of all non-Communist 
civil servants, landowners, industrialists and labor leaders, that 
might be a threat to Communist power.(Bark 124) The Western allies 
thought it was best to unite their zones into one economic unit. 
The Soviet Union had time and again violated the four-powers 
principles and decision on German unity, as well as ignoring
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political and economic preferences of the Germans by installing a 
Communist dominated government in their zone.
The first step in uniting the Western zones was to replace the 
old Reichsmark with the new Deutsche Mark. The Western allies 
could do this easily in their own zones, but when it came to 
introducing the new Deutsche Mark in Berlin this was more 
difficult. The divided city of Berlin was in the middle of the 
Soviet zone. When the Deutsche Mark was introduced into the 
western sections of Berlin in June 1948, the Soviet military forces 
closed off all land communications from the western sectors of 
Berlin. The Soviet loaders stated reason for the blockade was that 
the Reichsmark would have no value in the Western zones, but still 
be in circulation in the Soviet zone This could cause a flood of 
Reichsmark into the Soviet zone. The American reaction was to run 
an airlift to Berlin. Planes from the United States and Britain 
were able to transport the basic materials that the people of 
Berlin needed to survive. Stalin finally called of the blockade in 
May 1949 after six months of negotiations.(Rubinstein 242)
The Soviets reasons to run a blockade are not completely 
clear. Stalin may have wanted to force the Western powers out of 
Berlin and bring the entire city under Soviet control. If this 
happened, it would enhance the prospects of Soviet control over 
Germany and undermine the efforts of the Western allies from 
forming a united West Germany. And an allied surrender in Berlin 
would have strengthened the prestige of the Soviet Union while 
weakening that of the Western allies. Another view is that the
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Soviet Union was trying to force an agreement on the German 
question as a whole and trying to prevent the possibility of 
rearmed West German State.(Ulam-Rivals 148) There were certain 
factors mitigating the danger of the blockade: first that the 
blockade could be lifted instantaneously, and second that the 
Soviets were careful not to break off negotiations and never made 
it appear that the situation was beyond a diplomatic solution. 
(Ulam-Rivals 150)
Whatever the Soviet reasons the Americans saw the blockade as 
Soviet aggression in Germany. It became clear to U.S. leaders that 
the Soviets could not be worked with in negotiating a final outcome 
on Germany, and heightened their resolve to form a United West 
Germany. West Germany came into being in the latter months of 
1949. The effect of the blockade was that th^ U.S.-Soviet 
relationship had completely collapsed. The blockade helped lead to 
the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, 
which was created in April 1949. The United States did not only 
see the Soviet Union as a threat to Germany but of all of Western 
Europe.
The Berlin blockade is similar to other crisis between the 
Soviet Union and the United States. The two countries did not 
understand the objectives behind the others actions and they did 
not communicate to spell out their respective actions. The Soviet 
Union did not give the United States its objectives for the 
blockade and the United States saw it as Soviet aggression. The 
blockade is similar to other crisis because it stopped short of
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direct hostilities between the two sides. The United States 
decided on an airlift, instead of invading Berlin. The blockade 
showed how far the wartime alliance had deteriorated in just a few 
years, but the relationship would deteriorate even further.
1949-50
The years 1949-50, at least to the American perspective, was 
a period of crisis in the relationship between the United States 
and the Soviet Union. In August 1949, the Soviet Union exploded 
its first atomic weapon. The United States leaders did not expect 
the Soviets to get the bomb so quickly, they had hoped for a 
breathing period of maybe ten to fifteen years. Instead the period 
was only four yearn. The American monopoly on the most powerful 
weapon in the world had now ended and now the Soviet Union had the 
bomb. Many Americans were frightened at the aspect of the Soviet 
Union possessing this weapon. Also in 1949 the collapse of the 
Nationalist government in China led to the ascendancy of Mao Zedong 
and the Communist Pai ty. The United States blamed this on Soviet 
international Communist advancement. But the United States did not 
have a clear policy on China. From mid 1947 until 1950, since the 
situation in China had become complicated the U.S. reaction had 
been contradictory and confusing. The U.S. policy was to hope for 
the best, but it was not clear what the best was. (Ulam-Rivals 158) 
The Soviet-Sino alliance was signed on February 14, 1950. Moscow 
may have been quite surprised by American equanimity on the lose of 
China, and thought that they could be pushed farther in Asia, 
possible Korea.
Korea was divided into two parts, the northern part
dominated by the USSR and the southern half was friendly to the 
West. Both Korean governments wanted a unified country, but only 
on their own terms. In June 1950, North Korea attacked South 
Korea. The United States believed that the Soviet Union was behind 
the invasion, a testing American resolve in the region. The 
invasion led not just to American action, but to United Nations' 
action. The United Nations was able to intervene because at the 
time of the attack the Soviet Union was boycotting the Security 
Council and missed the vote on action in Korea. This leads to some 
question on the nature of the invasion decision; either Stalin did 
not order the invasion or he did not think the United States and 
the United Nations would react in such a way. The United States 
had done little when the Communists took over in China. And in 
January 1950, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson offered his 
infamous definition of American defense engagements in Asia, as 
running along a perimeter extending from Aleutians to Japan, 
Okinawa and the Philippines, excluding South Korea. This could 
have convinced Stalin, that the United States would not protect 
South Korea. The years 1949-50, were hard for the Americans to 
handle with respect to the Soviet Union. First the Soviet Union 
got the Atomic bomb, then China "fell" to Communism and then the 
Korean War, which many Americans felt was Soviet inspired. These 
events help to touch off a Red Scare in the United States.
The Red Scare
Americans were seeing Communism as the cause of everything
that was not going their way. Most Africans blamed international 
Communism for the "Jo: sM China and for the invasion of Korea. The 
Red Scare was also having its effect on U.S. administrators, nobody 
wanted to be seen as being weak on Communism. It was during this 
period of the early 1950s that Joseph McCarthy was able to rise to 
nations! prominence on hi s outlandish claim of Communism 
infiltration of the United States Government. During this period 
the idea of containment was fully accepted by the U.S. Government 
and by the American public. Another concept that was becoming 
accepted was the Domino Theory, that if one country in a region 
"fell” to Communism, then the other countries in the region would 
fall to Communism like dominos. This theory encouraged U.S. action 
in Korea and later in Vietnam. The Red Scare of the late 1940s and 
early 1950s created the image that Communism was lurking everywhere 
and it had to be stopped whenever possible. Although the mania of 
the Red Scare ended, the fear of the Communist threat did not.
But from a Soviet perspective the events of the late 1940s and 
early 1950s were not confrontational towards the United States. 
The Soviet had to develop atomic weapons, the United States had no 
right to have a monopoly on such an awesome weapon. And Stalin was 
not all that happy to see all of China become Communist. He did 
not even meet Mao when he arrived on his pilgrimage to Moscow in 
1950. China was a mixed blessing to the Soviet leadership. It was 
great in terms of prestige to the Soviet Union and Communist 
idealogy. But it was also a country so large that it would be hard 
for the Soviet Union to control. And with respect to the South
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Korean Invasion it is unclear of Moscow's intervention and 
intentions.
The 1950s
The 1950s saw the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953, and the rise
of Nikita Khrushchev in the Soviet Union. While the United States
was under the reigns of Dwight Eisenhower, and his middle of the
road policies as president from 1952-1960. With the death of
Stalin, there was no clear leader to take his place. Khrushchev
did not become the dominant figure until 1955 or 1956. Khrushchev
is an intriguing figure, as one author describes him it is almost
as if there were two Khrushchevs
one, a 'coexistentialist' eager for enhanced 
intercourse between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. ... and 
the other a militant Communist and bully ready to cash in 
on each and every weakness and hesitation of the West, 
threatening nuclear obliteration if his opponent would not 
submit.(Ulam -Rivals 249)
Khrushchev regime was a change from the Stalinist past. In foreign 
policy he was much more daring and he was willing to make 
agreements. In March of 1955 the Soviet Union unexpectedly dropped 
its demand that Austrian peace be linked to the German question and 
negotiated to end the occupation of Austria. The result was the 
Austrian Peace Treaty signed on May 15, 1955, which committed
Austria to a policy of nonalignment.(Rubinstein 281) At the Geneva 
Conference in July 1955, Khrushchev offered to institutionalize the 
status quo in Europe and to enter into peaceful coexistence with 
the United States. (Rubinstein 282) Khrushchev and the Soviet Union 
hoped to delay West German rearmament, which was allowed under the 
Paris Agreement in 1954. The agreement had also allowed for West
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German entry into NATO. The Soviet Union was deeply concerned with 
the rearmament of Germany, which they saw aimed at the Soviet Union 
and its allies. These effort can also be seen as an attempt by the 
Soviet Union to stop the rearmament of West Germany.
During this period the United States was under the 
leadership of Dwight Eisenhower. Eisenhower and his advisors 
anticipated a long-term competitive relationship with the Soviets, 
one reason for this wan Moscow's progress in nuclear weapon and the 
means to deliver them. Attempts to defeat the Soviet Union through 
thvi policy of containment ran the risk of bankrupting the United 
States.(Bailer 326) Under the Eisenhower administration, the U.S. 
took most actions not directly against the Soviet Union but in the 
Third World. In the case of Guatemala, Eisenhower sent in the CIA 
to help get rid of Guatemalan President Arbenz. Arbenz land reform 
programs and his lifting the ban on the Communist party went too 
far for most American Officials. The CIA did not have much direct 
intervention of the coup against the Arbenz government, buy the new 
government was heavily backed by the United States. In Lebanon, 
Eisenhower using an anti-communist rhetoric, dispatched 10,000 
marines to help bring abut an agreement that was favorable to the 
United States. And in January 1957 the Eisenhower Doctrine was 
annottnced, and administration-sponsored congressional resolution 
authorizing the United States to render military and economic aid 
to those countries in the Middle East, which required and requested 
it. (Ulam-Rivals 278) The Doctrine stated that it was in the 
interest of the United States , "to protect the territorial
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integrity and political independence of such nations requesting 
such aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled 
by international Communism.”(Ulam-Rivals 278) The Eisenhower 
doctrine was an attempt to formulate American policies in the 
Middle East, disguised in the only term which at the time could 
gain support, anti-Communist rhetoric. The threat of international 
Communism in the area was minimal at best and where it did exist it 
resulted from previous American policies in the region. American 
foreign policy under Eisenhower although not aimed directly agr.inst 
the Soviet Union was often aimed against international Communism. 
The Eisenhower administration saw the Soviet Union as its main 
competitor for influence in the Third World. The United States 
tried to gain influence in the Third World and tried to contain the 
influence of Communism. The Kennedy Administration followed up on 
this policy but one place they were unsuccessful was in Cuba.
The Cuban Missile Crisis
The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 has its roots in 1959. On 
January 1, 1959, the U.S.-backed Cuban leader Batista was ousted 
and replaced by the popular,later Communist, Fidel Castro. Castro 
hoped for Soviet protection against a very possible American move 
against him.(Ulam-Rivals 314) This move came in April 1961, when 
American President John Kennedy ordered the Bay of Pigs invasion. 
The invasion of Cuba by 1,500 CIA trained Cuban refugees was a 
complete disaster. The Bay of Pigs incident greatly reduced 
American prestige in Cuba, while turning Castro into a national 
hero* President Kennedy wanted to show he was as tough as the
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Russians, and he did not like a government 90 miles off the coast 
of Florida with strong ties to the Soviet Union. But the Soviet 
leaders got a different picture by the failed invasion. It 
confirmed Soviet feelings that the Kennedy administration was 
inexperienced, lacked assurance and probable under the thumb of the 
CIA and Pentagon. (Windows 107) The Soviet leaders also saw this as 
a chance to push the Kennedy Administration around and gain their 
own advantages.
And this is exactly what the Soviet Union tried to do. The 
Soviet Union moved medium range nuclear weapons launchers to Cuba. 
The missiles were discovered by the United States, by U2 
overflights of the island. President Kennedy ordered a blockade of 
Cuba, which the Soviet leaders took as a dramatic step. The 
situation got even hotter when a U2 flight over Cuba was shot down 
by the Soviets, and another U2 strayed into Soviet territory. The 
two sides were very close to war, as Kennedy said there ’’was a one- 
in-three chance of war. " (Allison 9) Why did the Soviet Union risk 
World War III by moving their missiles into Cuba. As of present 
day, we do not know the Soviet true intentions, but there have been 
a few theories put forth.
The Soviet Union's official explanation was that it was their
desire to help the Cuban leaders defend the island against 
intervention originating in the U.S. The well known 
adventure at Bay of Pigs showed that the U.S. administration 
was ready to render all assistance... to bring Cuba's 
neighboring Central American states into the conflict, in 
order to overthrow the Cuban leadership. (Windows 105)
But few believe that the Soviet leaders risked a nuclear war to
save Castro. The conventional wisdom holds that Khrushchev did not
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like the U.S. having their nuclear weapons all over the world, such 
as on the Soviet Union's border in Turkey, while the Soviet Union 
did not have a right to put it missiles where they wanted. And 
though the United States had a huge nuclear warhead edge, 5,000 to 
300, stationing the missiles in Cuba would be a first step towards 
nuclear parity. It does not seem that Khrushchev had a well 
thought out plan for stationing the missiles in Cuba, and how 
President Kennedy might respond and how he would respond to U.S. 
actions. The missiles were poorly camouflaged, if at all, and were 
easily spotted by U.S. overflights. There was some need to protect 
Castro and Cuba. A Communist outpost 90 miles off the coast of the 
United States was not only strategically important but politically 
important for Communism. With the missiles in Cuba, with some 
Soviet troops stationed there, an attack on Cuba would be extremely 
unlikely. (Allison 107) But the main reason, many believe, for the 
Soviet missiles, were to improve the military-strategic position of 
the Soviet Union in confrontation with the United States; it would 
restrain American aggressiveness and reduce the capacity of the 
United States to conduct negotiation, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, 
from the position of strength.(Allison 108)
But not all exports agree with these reason for the Soviet 
missiles in Cuba. As Adam Ulam states "one does not risk an 
immediate nuclear war to ensure that your opponent will be only 
twice as strong rather than four times.(Rivals 332) Ulam states 
that Khrushchev had a master plan, behind him placing the missiles 
in Cuba. Khrushchev wanted the United States to sign a German
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peace treaty renouncing for West Germany, the right to own or 
manufacture nuclear weapons and the stop China from obtaining 
nuclear weapons.(RivaIs 325) In this view the Soviet Union was 
more concerned with the nuclear capabilities of West Germany and 
China than with the U.S. and Cuba. The Soviet Union wanted to push 
the United States into a German peace treaty and an agreement to 
stop West Germany and China from obtaining nuclear weapons, 
Whatever the reasons for the missiles in Cuba, the realization of 
nuclear war frightened both sides, and some positive agreements 
between the two superpowers came out cf the crisis.
The Cuban Missile Crisis is reminiscent of other U.S.-Soviet 
crises. Again each side did not understand the objectives behind 
the other side. The Soviet Union did not realize how the United 
States would react to Soviet missiles 90 miles off their coast. 
The Soviet Union figured the U.S deserved a bit of their own 
medicine, since the United States had missiles on the Soviet 
border. But the United States saw their nuclear weapons as 
protecting against Soviet expansion, not as means to delivery an 
Unprovoked attack on the Soviet Union, The American saw Soviet 
missiles as a means to attack the United States. And the U.S. 
leaders did not understand that the Soviet Union thought it had a 
right to put its nuclear weapons were they pleased. And like other 
crises the two superpowers were able to avoid war, but this time it 
was dangerously close.
Kennedy and Khrushchev moved quickly to reduce tensions, and 
beginning with the Test Ban Treaty of 1963, helped to create the
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building blocs of a less volatile and more constructive 
relationship.(George 1) The Test Ban treaty outlawed the above 
ground testing of nuclear weapons. The famous “hot line" between 
the Kremlin and the White House was also installed. Before this 
there was no direct communication's link-up between the leaders of 
the United States and the Soviet Union. This had help to 
complicate communications during the Cuban Crisis. The period of 
good relations between the United States and the Soviet Union 
immediate after the missile crisis would reach its peak with the 
period of detente in the late 1960s and early '70s, under Soviet 
leader Leonid Brezhnev and American President Richard Nixon.
Detente
Detente means a relaxation of tension. The U.S. and the 
Soviet Union had been close to war over the Cuban Crisis* and a 
relaxation of tensions looked good to both sides. Detente emerged 
as a result of policies made by the Soviet and American leaders* 
and it was shaped in a way in which efforts would be taken in an 
effort to define a new relationship, that would replace the 
hostility of the Cold War, moderate conflict inherent in their 
competition and strengthen cooperation in areas where their 
interests converged. (George 19) Detente did not mean an end to 
competition. It reflected a mutual recognition that the 
competition could not be safely regulated by threats of 
confrontations or by mutual avoidance. Both governments showed 
during the early period of detente, that they were unwilling to 
withdraw from their global power positions. The United State's
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Secretary of State, Hoary Kissinger eagerly pursed an exclusionary 
diplomacy in the Middle East, and tried to link U.S.-Soviet 
normalization with the opening of the Peoples Republic of 
China.(George 325) Soviet leader Brezhnev stated that detente 
would not lead the Sov;ets to endorse the international status quo 
or to abandon national liberation movements or anti-western 
governments. This can be seen by Soviet support for Egypt and 
Syria.(George 325) Although detente did not cease the competition 
between the United States and the Soviet Union, the early years 
lead to some promising agreements.
The Basic Principles Agreement, BPA, was signed by Nixon and 
Brezhnev at their first Summit meeting in 1972. The agreement was 
described by the leaders as a sort of charter for detente. The two 
sides agreed to adopt the practice of periodic high-level meetings, 
continue efforts to limit armaments and to begin to develop 
economic, scientific and cultural ties between the U.S. and the 
USSR on a long term basis to strengthen their relationship.(George 
23) The BPA stated common assumptions and responsibilities between 
the United States and Soviet Union. The first assumption was that 
they proceeded from the common determination that in a nuclear age 
there is no alternative but to conduct their mutual relations on 
the basis of peaceful coexistence. The differences in ideology and 
social systems between the two powers will not prevent normal 
relations based on the principles of equality, sovereignty, and 
noninterference in internal affairs.(George 107) The second point 
is that the United States and the Soviet Union place the utmost
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importance to preventing the developing of situations capable of 
causing dangerous acceleration of tensions. Both countries would 
do their best to avoid military confrontation and to prevent the 
outbreak of nuclear war. And both sides agreed that efforts to 
gain unilateral advantage at the cost of the other, are 
inconsistent with these objectives.(George 107) And lastly the 
United States and the Soviet Union, have a special responsibility, 
as do the other three members, Great Britain, France and China, of 
the United Nations Security Council, to do everything in thsiy 
power to make sure that conflicts or situations will not arise 
which would serve to increase international tensions. The BPA 
sounds nice and quite promising, but it war. also very vague, which 
would cause problems for the detente between the two superpowers.
The early years of detente al so wi tnesned a series of 
bilateral agreements on: controlling the arms race, controlling 
nuclear weapons proliferation, the diffusion of the Berlin issue, 
recognizing the division of Europe, and expanding East West trade 
and collaborating on scientific, cultural, environmental, health 
and related fields.(George 330) At their second summit in June 
1973, Nixon and Brezhnev signed the Agreement on Prevention of 
Nuclear War, APNW, in which they reiterated their commitment to 
cooperate in crisis prevention. The agreement included a much 
stronger nd more explicit obligation that the two powers engage in 
urgent consultations if the situation developed anywhere in th« 
world that raised the possibility of nuclear warfare. It was 
designed not only to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war between
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the superpowers but any nuclear combat that might occur between 
countries.(George 111) The Helsinki Final Act was signed at the 
end of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, CSCE, 
including the leaders of the thirty-three European states plus, the 
United States and Canada. The Document contained a variety of 
provisions pledging the signatories not only to cooperation in 
European security but to a whole range of economic, Scientific and 
humanitarian measures.(Ulam-Dangerous Relations 141)
For all the promises and hopes of detente, the relationship 
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union deteriorated between the two 
countries after thir early success. The main reason for this 
disintegration of detente was that each side had a different view 
of detente, different objectives they wished to obtain through 
detente.
For the Soviet Union the roots of detente were to be found in 
development' , the most important of which are military in 
hitute' the status of equality to the U.S. in strategic nuclear 
weapons, and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty SALT I. The 
leaders of the Soviet Union believed that detente was the beat 
eFNbfefftehfc♦ 4ti an environment dominated by the ever-present risk 
if nuclear war between the two superpowers. (George 120) The Soviet 
leadMfi believed that the United States had no alternative but to 
alter its tildillonal anti-Soviet posture, once Moscow acquired the 
ability tp destroy the United States in the event of direct 
hostilities, The SovietB alio regarded, detente aa a necessary 
precondition for the resolution of many outstanding Soviet security
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problems. The leaders of the Soviet Union believed that their 
enhanced military capabilities left the U.S. with little choice but 
to acknowledge the emerging global character of Moscow's political 
interests.(George 121) To the Soviet Union detente symbolized the
end of the U.S. ability to dominate, without reference to the 
Soviet preferences; political, military, and economic developments 
in Western-orientated environments as the NATO countries and the 
Middle East. (George 3,?6)
Increased trade with the United States was another reason the 
Soviet Union entered uto detente. Until 1971, American exports to 
the Soviet Union seldom totaled more than $100 million a year. But 
in 1971 they totaled $162, $550 million in 1972 and in 1973 the 
U.S. exports totalled $1.3 bi1lion.(Goldman 4) The economic 
benefits from new and friendlier atmosphere of Soviet-American 
relations helped the Soviet Union overcome an agricultural crisis 
due to a disastrous harvest in 1972. The Soviet Union was able to 
purchase large quantities of grain at relatively low cost and that 
was actually subsidized by the U.S. treasury. The United States 
had always been reluctant to trade with the Soviet Union, because 
they were afraid the Soviets would gain more from the trade than 
the U.S. received from the trade. The Soviet Union hoped detente 
would lead to trade not only in agriculture but in scientific and 
technical fields. Although the Soviet leaders were pleased by the 
grain purchase , they would become disappointed when trade was 
tried to be expanded to other areas.
Tile Soviet goals for detente included: gaining official
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confirmation as the United States nuclear equal, to press their 
claims for political equality and attempt to reduce the risks 
associated with the Soviet-U.S. competition in the Third World, 
increased trade with the United States and an agreement on the 
status quo of Europe. But the goals and ideas about detente of the 
United Stated, differed from those possessed by the Soviet Union.
For the United States, the policy was one among several 
choices. It was a decibion designed mainly by Mixon and Kissinger 
to pursue a less hostile and more cooperate relationship with 
Moscow. The U.S. stiategy sought to envelop the Soviets in a web 
of economic ties that would deepen the Soviet Union's stake in the 
continued detente with the United States. Kissinger believed it 
was vital to forge linkages between the economic side of detente 
and Third World competition. Nixon and Kissinger also were 
intrigued by the possibility of establishing a tripolar balance of 
power between the U.S., the Soviet Union, and the Peoples Republic 
of China. By developing friendly relations with both of these 
traditional archivals, the U.S. might be able to reduce the 
potential threats to its interest from either side and introduce 
each a greater cooperation with U.S. policy.(George 21) The 
different goals and views between the United States and the USSR 
led to a breakdown of detente.
Detente as originally defined as a mixed collaborative- 
competitive relationship. The breakdown occurred because each side 
tried to define the terms of competition, and the term of 
collaboration, in ways to maximize their unilateral advantage, not
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towards expanding tho mutual interest of their relationship* 
(George 320) The two main areas of misunderstanding were their 
respective interests in the Middle East and the role the two sides 
would play in the search for a solution of the Arab* Israeli 
conflict. There was a I so misunderstanding in the limits the United 
States would observe in developing closer ties with the PRC.(George 
324) The United States, having been lead to believe the detente 
would mean a reduction of Soviet Third World activity* saw Soviet 
action in this area as confrontational. The Soviet leaders 
stressed that "international class struggle" would continue 
regardless of bilateral agreements between the United States and 
Soviet Union. And the Soviet Union would lend whatever help it 
deemed appropriate* and prudent, to those countries involved in the 
struggle. (George 127) The Soviet Union and the U.S. also had 
different views on the BPA and the "rules of detente".
The Basic Principles Agreement gave the erroneous impression 
that the United Stater, and the Soviet Union were in basic agreement 
on the rules of the game and the restraints to be observed in their 
competition in third areas. It would have been better from the 
U.S. standpoint, for the two superpowers to openly state that they 
disagreed over peaceful coexistence and that in the respect for 
rules regulating then r competition in third areas remained an 
unresolved issue.(George 110) On the Soviet side, its leaders were 
interested in using the BPA and the APNW to help evoke or control 
crisis carrying the danger of nuclear war with the United States 
and a official statement that the Soviet Union had gained nuclear
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parity with the United States. Nixon and Kissinger in additior
avoiding nuclear war hoped these agreements would help to moderate
Soviet efforts to mako gains in third areas at the expense of the 
U.S., whether or not such behavior would lead to dangerous crises 
of the kind feared by the Soviets.(George 114 5) Soviet leaders 
saw BPA as a renunciation of U.S. policy, that until the late 1960s 
was based upon the existence of superior and more numerous nuclear 
weapons. The Soviet Union because of their teaching nuclear parity 
with the United State:., which they believed was agreed upon in the 
BPA, was now a superpower in political as well as military terms. 
To the American leaders, parity in nuclear terms carried with it 
few special privilege:, in the world of international politics. In 
those areas there the Soviet Union had long been dominant, its 
interest would be respected. But this had been the case, for 
virtually the entire post-war period. These differences between 
the U.S. and the Soviet Union were the roots of the breakdown of 
detente.
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the 
Helsinki Final Act also help lead to the breakdown of detente. The 
Soviet Union hoped to gain confirmation on the status quo of Europe 
from the Helsinki agreement. The Soviet Union had been long 
frustrated by its inability to get formal recognition of the post- 
World War II settlement and frontiers established "provisionally" 
at the Potsdam Conference. The United States and its Western 
allies were not going to upset Soviet hegemony by armed force, or 
risk war to assist those in the Soviet sphere.(Bell 100) This had
Sovietalready been demonstrated by the Western acquiescence of 
action in Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1969. But the 
Soviet leaders wanted it in writing. They believed this would 
grant the Soviet Union added legitimacy in Eastern Europe and 
possible increase their international prestige. The Helsinki Final 
Act confirmed the post-War status quo of Europe as the Soviet 
leaders wanted, but the agreement had many side effects that they 
did not expect nor want,
The Helsinki accords had no legal force on the Soviet hegemony 
in Eastern Europe. The part on the inviolability of frontiers did 
not rule out the prospect of peaceful change, since the Germanise 
could not have signed the agreement if it had. (Bell 108) The 
agreement also seemed to have awakened the half- forgotten feelings 
of guilt. The Helsinki Final Act also contained a section on human 
rights, Basket Three. Basket Three required the signatories not to
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place undue obstacles in the paths of citizens seeking to be
reunited with families abroad or to m a n y  foreigners, ease
regulations concerning movement of citizens from other
participating states in their territory, arid a clause on religious 
freedom. (U1 atn-Dangerous Relations 142) Basket Three became a major 
source of embarrassment to the Soviet Government. This was 
something which the soviet leaders did not expect. They had 
already been a signatory of other international agreements and 
declarations and occasional violations by the Soviet Union was 
accepted. But the Helsinki process continued through regularly 
scheduled international conferences, and there was a lot of Western
pressure on the Soviet Union to practice better human right* 
especially towt&rds Soviet Jews and dissidents. The embarrassment 
of the Helsinki helper! the Soviet Union lose interest in detente.
From about 1974 75 detente was in a period of decline. The 
United States policy in the Middle East , under Kissinger, helped 
to quicken the fall of detente. Kissinger's exclusionary policy in 
the Middle East; the Israeli-Egyptian disengagement agreement in 
January 1974 and a similar agreement between Israel and Syria in 
May 1974 upset the Soviet leaders. The agreement between Israel 
and Syria angered the Soviet leaders especially. The Soviets had 
worked hard to consolidate influence in Syria and they saw this 
agreement, as a U.S. threat to their relationship. (George 327) 
Tne American policy of linkage between economics and Soviet Policy 
also helped the breakdown of detente. The Jackson-Vanik and 
Stevenson amendments to the U.S. Soviet trade agreement were on the 
causes. The Jackson-Vanik amendment formally linked most-favored- 
nation status for the Soviet Union with Soviet Jewish emigration 
policy. The Stevenson amendment restricted credit allocation the 
Soviet Union to $300 million over four years, a small amount 
compared to whet the Soviet leaders expected. The Soviet leaders 
rejected the linkage policy. They wanted to instead maximize 
reciprocal exchange within the policy realms. They wanted to 
insulate their agreements with the United States from other 
dealings. item 1975 onward, the Soviets escalated their 
competitive activity in the Third World. They gave material and 
military assistance to North Vietnam in their final offensive. The
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Soviets also gave he lp to Angolan,1975-6. Ethiopia, 1978, and 
South Yemen in 1978. The Soviet Union realized that the U.S, did 
not accept their basic premises of detente: greater importance of 
the U.S. relationship than that of the U.S., USSR, PRC triangle, 
insulation of the commitments of SALT I and trade agreements from 
Third World competition and acceptance of their claim as equal 
status to the U.S. as a global power.(George 320) Meanwhile the 
United States saw the Soviet action in the Third World as 
hostility and breaking the rules of detente. The complete 
breakdown of detent** occurred with the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan and the subsequent American grain embargo. Although 
detente was not lasting period of better relations, it did produce 
some meaningful agreements, especially in arms control.
Arms Control
Arms control is an issue that played an important role in 
detente and throughout the 1980s and into the 90s. From the end of 
the Second World War until the late 1960s, the United States and 
the Western allies had a distinct advantage in nuclear forces. In 
the late 1960s, early 1970s the Soviet Union reached nuclear parity 
with the United Staten, Now it was assumed that each side had the 
capability to deliver an annihilating retaliatory strike on the 
other, even after subjection to a first strike.(Hudson 176) During 
the seventies, the two important treaties were reached between the 
U.S. and the Soviet Union; SALT I and II. Although SALT IX was 
never ratified by the United States Senate, the leaders agreed to 
adhere by the agreement. The SALT I treaty in 1972 was the first
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time a limitation cap was put on a nuclear system. The agreement 
put ceilings on t lie number of intercontinental ballistic missi les 
and nuclear submariner.. The number of anti-bal 1 istic missile, ABM, 
systems a nation could have was also limited to two. ABMs were 
considered very dangerous because they were designed to protect an 
area against nuclear attack. If the Soviet Union or the united 
States felt they were significantly protected by their ABM systems 
their leadership might be more likely to launch a preemptive
strike. The number of ABM systems was later induced to one. The
SALT I agreement was to be verified by national technical means, 
which was by satellites. SALT II which in many respects was a 
looser agreement than SALT I, it put a limit on the number of
delivery systems, and each side agreed to limit the number of
MIRVs, multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles. Although 
SALT I and SALT II did limit certain quantitative dimensions of the 
arms race, both sides, continued to make rapid advances in nuciear 
war-fighting, or hard target k<ll capabilities.(Hudson 51) There 
were no other major aims control treaties until the Gorbachev era, 
where it seems that the United States and the Soviet Union have 
substantially limited the arms control race and the possible threat 
of nuclear war.
But even before the Gorbachev era the USSR was changing its 
stance on nuclear weapons. In 1977 at Tula, Brezhnev affirmed that 
the Soviet Union was not striving for superiority m  armaments with 
the aim of delivering a first strike.(Hudson 177) The Soviets also 
accepted the idea that a first-strike capability was both
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unattainable and irrelevant, which lead to their acceptance of 
’’mutual assured destruction” or MAD. The idea of MAD lead to a 
consensus in the Soviet Union that nuclear war is so unpromising 
and dangerous that it is only a policy in theory, an instrument of 
policy which cannot be used.(Hudson 177) In 1981 Brezhnev denied 
that their could be a victory in a nuclear war, and in 1982 
announced a no-first, use policy, a pledge not to fire nuclear 
weapons before they had first been launched by the other side. 
Even before Gorbachev, the Soviet Union was coming around toward a 
more Western outlook of nuclear weapons. And under Gorbachev* the 
View would be furthered that the Soviet nuclear forces would be 
used in defense only, which led to some positive arms control 
agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union.
The Gorbachev Era
When Mikhail S. Gorbachev came to power in 1985, no one knew the 
changes the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and the rest of the world 
would be in for. During the Gorbachev era there has been a move 
restructuring, perestroika, openness, glasnost, democratization, 
and increased personal freedoms. Under Gorbachev there has been at 
first a loosening up of Eastern Europe and then the collapse of 
Soviet power and domination in the former Soviet empire. In terms 
of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, they have reached a high point in 
;t^l'i:^;r^liifipn8hip« They have made agreements on arms control, 
conventional weapons in Europe, the reunification of Germany and 
wee even together in their condemnation in the United Nations of 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The U.S.“Soviet relationship has come
a long way under Gorbachev and U.S. presidents Reagan and Bush. 
Many believe that the Cold War is over, and that Mikhail Gorbachev 
is the main reason for this, with the U.S. willingly following 
their lead. Before a closer look is given at the Soviet-American 
relationship, it will be helpful to look at the internal change and 
foreign policy change under Gorbachev.
Gorbachev's two ma^or internal programs for change in the 
soviet Union are perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost 
(openness, or publicity). Perestroika seeks to correct the one- 
dimensionality of Soviet superpower status through internal 
economic reforms, changes in military doctrine and political 
reforms.(Hudson 6) Under perestroika, Gorbachev has overhauled the 
Soviet political system, trying to introduce multi-candidate 
elections, freer elections and a more responsive government. In 
this overhaul of the state structure, the Communist Party is no 
longer all powerful, and General Secretary Gorbachev has become the 
more powerful President Gorbachev. All these changes in the 
political makeup of the Soviet Union, have raised popular 
expectations. The people seem to now want more free democratic 
elections, but will Gorbachev be willing to grant this request?
The other major Gorbachev reform, glasnost, has allowed 
intellectual to discuss numerous social and political problems 
relatively freely in Soviet academic journals, plays* books, and 
movies. (Hudson 100) It has also meant open criticism of the short 
comings of Soviet society and those responsible, and more attention 
the darker side of Soviet life; such as prostitution, drugs and
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crime.(Nelson 129) Glasnost has also meant open and broad debate 
on security policy such as military doctrine and arms control. 
Glasnost has also mere recently led to an opening up of the Soviet 
Press and television. It is not uncommon to see articles 
criticizing Gorbachev or his policies. There had also been an 
opening up of mass demonstrations, even when they are against the 
regime. But earlier this year Gorbachev tried to ban 
demonstrations. Gorbachev did not have expected, nor wished, for 
glasnost to have gone as far as it has. but it is hard to give 
people a taste of freedom and not expect them to want more.
Early on, Gorbachev and his leadership came to some 
conclusions about Soviet national security: one is that the Soviet 
Union cannot achieve strategic nuclear superiority over the United 
States. Second that the continuation of the arms race, especially 
into space, where the edge in Western technology is great, posses 
the possibility of a surge in American technology that could 
endanger the state of strategic equality. And that a continued and 
intensified arms rac^ would divert human and material resources 
from Gorbachev's economic reform.(Bailer 458) These conclusions 
helped to change Soviet national security policy.
One of the new concepts Gorbachev has ret forth is of "mutual 
Security”. He seen a link in national security and mutual 
security, He is the first Soviet leader to state that the Soviet 
Union cannot pursue its own security at the expense of other 
countries, especially the United States. Gorbachev has stated that 
there can be "not security for the USSR without security for the
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United States."(Bailer 453) Gorbachev's view of mutual security is 
based on the premise that meaningful and stable relations can not 
be achieved in the nuclear age by individual nations attempts to 
attain effective deter;ence. Technology and uncertainty will 
always increase war-fighting capability and undermine deterrence. 
Mutual security sees both sides as hostages to the nuclear arms 
race,and the only way out is through cooperation on a broad 
front.(Hudson 51)
Another policy in national security proposed by Gorbachev has 
been "reasonable sufficiency". The concept of "reasonable 
sufficiency" envision:; the reduction of nuclear and conventional 
forces to the limits ’sufficient for defense”, a level that would 
eliminate any offensive capability. (Hudson 175-6) "Reasonable 
sufficiency" consists of nuclear arsenals capable of launching a 
secure second strike, conventional forces capable only of 
defending, not conduct ing offensive operations and interventionary 
forces capable of deferring an aggressor in regional crises, but 
unable to prop up a regime incapable of defending itself.(Bailer 
112) Two elements of this policy are crucial, the reductions of 
conventional forces should move towards elimination of offensive 
capability on both sides, and the readiness for "unequal, 
asymmetrical" reductions in those areas were one side has an 
advantage.(Hudson 53) New Soviet thinking on their own national 
security, has provided the way for Soviet-American agreements on 
both conventional and nuclear forces.
The INF treaty in 1987, was a breakthrough agreement between
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the United States and the Soviet Union. It provided for the first 
time the elimination of an entire class of nuclear arms, land-based 
missiles of intermediate and shorter range, based in Europe. It 
was also a major agreement because it provided on-site verification 
of the missiles, something that the U.S. had been pushing for a 
long time, but the Soviet had been unwilling to on-site inspection 
and the fact that the Soviet Union was withdrawing four times as 
many warheads as the United States, proved to the U.S. leaders that 
the Soviet Union was truly serious about the arms control 
agreement. Gorbachev described the INF treaty as a "major event in 
world politics" and a "victory for new political thinking"(White 
116)
In november 1990, the U.S. and the Soviet Union along with the 
members of NATO and the former Warsaw pact signed the conventional 
forces in Europe, CFE, treaty. The treaty drastically cut the 
number of conventional land armies in Europe. Again the amount of 
Soviet and Warsaw Fact countries were larger than the U.S. and 
NATO cuts. Though the CFE has run into some major difficulties. 
The INF and CFE treaties show that when working together, the 
Soviet Union and the United States are able to make important 
agreements, not only on nuclear weapons but also on conventional.
U.S.-Soviet relations have shown a real improvement in the 
last few years. One of the best indicators of this improvement 
came with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990. This 
incident touched off an international crisis in the Persian Gulf 
region. The United States and the Soviet Union joined in the
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condemnation of the invasion. Former Soviet Foreign Minister 
Eduard Shevardnadze stated of the situation that: there exists 
"principles and norms of international law, such concepts as 
respect for the inviolability for existing borders and observance 
of world law and order. (CDSP vol. XLII no 39 p9) The United States 
and Soviet Union, working together in the United Nations, helped to 
pass a number of resolutions against Iraq stating that it must 
leave Kuwait and restore the government that was in power prior to 
the invasion. The U.N. also added economic sanctions against Iraq, 
and a resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq, if 
President Saddam Hussein did not remove his forces from Kuwait by 
January 15, 1990. For a change the United States and the Soviet 
Union were working together, not against each other,in the United 
Nations during an international crisis.
The United States was the main actor, along with its coalition 
partners, in the Persian Gulf War. It was the United States that 
had 500,000 troops in the region, along with thousands of aircraft, 
tanks and along with battleship and cruisers, and supplied most of 
the other munitions. It was the U.S. that look the lead role in 
the air campaign against Iraq, which begun on January 15, 1990 and 
it was the United States that was the main player in the land war 
against Iraq, that freed Kuwait. It was also U.S. troops who 
risked their lives, and many who lost their lives or were injured 
in freeing Kuwait. The U.S. military deserves a lot of credit for 
their campaign against Iraq and the liberation of Kuwait. The 
Soviet Union did not play a military role in the campaign, but
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their cooperation wan crucial. It probably would not have been 
possible for the buildup of half a million U.S. troops and military 
action to be taken against a former Soviet ally, if these were 
still the Cold War days. It was important that the United States 
had Soviet support or at least not their disapproval in the Gulf 
war.
From the time Iiaq invaded Kuwait, the Soviet Government was 
for the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait and restoring the situation 
that appeared before the invasion. The Soviet Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs stated that "the sovereignty, national independence and 
territorial integrity of the state of Kuwait must be fully restored 
and protected.(CDSP vol XLII MO. 32 p$) The Soviet Union has 
appeared strong in opposing the invasion, even though Iraq had been 
a long time ally of Soviet Union, having a Treaty of Friendship and 
Agreement signed in 1072. There have been some commentators who 
attributed the Soviet policy line solely to a desire for economic 
assistance from the West. (CDSP vol. XLII No. 32) But both the 
Soviet press and the administration dispel this idea, and attribute 
the Soviet position to "new thinking” in the Soviet Union. The 
crisis also put a stiain on the Soviet economy. The Soviet were 
not able to take advantage of the increased oil prices, because of 
declining production of oil . The Soviet Union also lost the 
subsides provided by Kuwait of the development of oil production in 
areas of Siberia and the arctic.(CDSP XLII No 33 pl3) The Soviet 
Union, while favoring Iraq's withdrawal, was against the use of
force.
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Before the January 15 deadline, Gorbachev sent special envoy, 
Yevgeny M. Primakov to meet with Hussein, Primakov had to meeting 
with Hussein, and triod to find a peaceful solution to the crisis. 
Gorbachev also sent two Deputies Foreign Ministers, A.M. Belonogob 
and V T  Petrovshiy to the Middle East in an effort to try to find 
a political solution.(FBIS Nov 20, 1990 p20) From the beginning 
Gorbachev was in fav<>r of Arab participation in the crisis and 
widening the scope of the involvement, in the crisis. Many Western 
officials felt that the Soviet Union was trying to forge 
unrealistically close* links between the crisis in the gulf and the 
whole Palestian problcm.(Lewis,"Soviet Aide urges”) The United 
States rejected the idea of directly linking the invasion of Kuwait 
to the whole problem of instability in the middle East.
In terms of Soviet military personnel in the crisis, the Soviet 
Union contributed two small warships to the International Gulf 
Force; the vessels weio deployed only in defense of Soviet shipping 
and citizens.(Kraus) Some believed that a Soviet involvement int 
the Gulf war could have provoked a backlash from the country's 50 
million Muslims and increased the activity of the opposition within 
the Soviet Union, But the United States seemed satisfied with the 
level of Soviet involvement. One thing that the U.S. was not 
satisfied with was the number of Soviet personnel in Iraq. During 
the crisis there was question about the number and position of 
Soviet personnel in Iraq. There were conflicting reports from the 
beginning on the number in Iraq. There was some hesitation to 
remove these advisers/technicians because of feared retaliation on
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the Soviet hostages in Iraq. If there wo:e any Soviet advisers 
left in Iraq at the time of the war it seems they played not part.
From the onset Moscow stated that it would strictly comply 
with United Nation's sanctions against Iraq, even though it caused 
financial and economical problems. The Soviet Union faced a 
shortfall of $800 million of hard currency and oil from Iraq and 
Kuwait. (CDSP XLII No 37 plO) The U.N. Security Council, before the 
resolution authorizing force, passed ten resolutions, declaring 
Kuwaits' annexation null and void and imposing far-reaching 
sanctions against ling. The Soviet Union was in support of them 
all. The Soviet Union believed that the resolution authorizing the 
use of force was a turning point in the international, relations and 
could lead to more creditable role for the U.S, in resolving 
conflicts and preserving international peace.(Lewis, "U.S. Gives 
Iraq")
Before the staid, of the ground war, the Soviet leaders, tried 
one last time to reach a peaceful solution. President Gorbachev 
presented a plan for the withdrawal from Kuwait, to Iraqi leaders. 
The plan was believed to combine an unconditional Iraqi withdrawal 
from Kuwait with pledges of Soviet help in pieserving Iraq's 
sovereignty and in calling for a Middle East peace 
conference,(Schmemann, "Russians, Citing Suffering) This came 
after nine days of diplomatic talks initiated by the Soviets to 
find a political resolution before an all-out ground offensive. 
The U.S. indicated that the plan had nothing in it that would cause 
a delay in the ground attack. Gorbachev felt that the U.S.-led
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alliance, in a ground offensive threatened to exceed U.N. 
mandate.(Schmemann, Gorbachev’s Gamble") The Soviet, leaders argued 
that a ground offensive would cause enormous suffering and 
destruction of the country.(Schmemann, Russians Citing Suffering") 
Gorbachev spokesman Vitaly N. Ignatenko stated, "The offensive will 
only result in more suffering and bloodshed. Our stand is that new 
casualties should l>e avoided."(Schmemann, Russians Citing 
Suffering") The United States, although initially suspicious, 
stated that they had concluded that the Soviet Union mediation was 
not some mischievous. Cold War scheme trying to frust i ite U.S. 
policy in the Gulf.(Friedman "Mo Subterfuge in") The U.S. went 
along with the ground war against Soviet: pleas, the Soviet Union 
though not happy, did not denounce the military effort.
Now that the Persian Gulf War is over, whoie does the U.L.- 
Soviet relationship stand in 1991? There wore some who thought 
that the Gulf War would tear the relationship apart, but this did 
not happen. United States Secretary of State Howard Baker stated 
that he hoped and expected that: the Soviet Union would remain a 
"constructive partner" with the United States in stabilizing the 
post-war Persian Gu1f.(Friedman, "U.S. and Kremli i") And new 
Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmerthnyk said "what matters 
most is that the Soviet-U.S. relationship has gone through a very 
difficult test and passed tha' test, and this opens reliable 
prospects for future developments."(Friedman, "U.s. and Kremlin") 
Although the relationship survived the Gulf Crisis, there seems to 
be possible cracks in the relationship.
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One of these cracks is in arms control. Back in February 1990 
both sides announced they were close to a Strategic Arms Reduction 
freaty* START, and that all that was left were largely 'technical 
details' .(Friedman.” U.S. and Kremlin”) But over a year later 
there is sti*1 no START agreement. The main differences that 
remain are over treaty verification. And each side is blaming the 
other, reminiscent of the Cold War era. The Soviet leaders have 
accused the Bush administration of stalling and not being able to 
meet them halfway. And U.S. officials have stated that Gorbachev 
appears to be under pressure form the Soviet military and its 
military-industrial base, who think that Moscow has already mad too 
many concessions on arm control.(Friedman, ”U.S. and Kremlin”) 
There has also been problems with the CFE treaty. After singing, 
the Soviet Union insisted on excluding three naval division 
because they are involved in shore defense and technically not 
covered in the treaty dealing with land armies. This incident has 
annoyed many U.S. officials, including President Bush. He has 
stated that he will not submit the treaty for Senate ratification 
until the Soviets drop this demand.
Another possible crack in the relationship is the shift in 
Gorbachev to the right. He has been under pressure from the right- 
wing in Soviet Government. The Soviet conservatives have made a 
strong comeback. On December 20, 1990 Soviet Foreign Minister 
Eduard Shevardnadze resigned, he warned that “reactionaries” 
threaten his country with dictatorship. (Keller-”Shevardnadze stuns 
Kremlin”) Shevardnadze had been one of Gorbachev's strongest
supporters of Gorbachev's reform programs. Shevardnadze that
the reformers have gone into hiding. A dictatorship is 
approaching- I tell you with full responsibility. No one 
knows what this dictatorship will be like, what kind of 
dictator will come to power and what order will be 
established.(Keller-"Shevardnadze Stuns Kremlin”)
Gorbachev has stated that the resignation would not cause a change
in Soviet foreign policy. Liberals in the Soviet Union viewed
Shevardnadze's as n warning against becoming a hostage to
authoritarian-minded forces, which the liberals view as bent on
crushing the country's struggling democracy. (Keller-"Moscow Gossips
about”) These forces had harshly criticized Shevardnadze.
The right-wing forces in the Communist Party atti^ked
Shevardnadze for tolerating the reunification of Germany and the
collapse of the satellite governments in Eastern Europe, for
bringing the Soviet mi litary home too quickly, for negotiating arms
treaties with the West that cut disproportionately into Soviet
missiles and tanks, and for following too closely the American lead
on policy in the Gulf. (Keller-“Shevardnadze Stuns ^j&eielin") The
parliamentary faction Soyuz, union, has united the hard-liners in
the Supreme Soviet, form a wide range of backgrounds.(Keller*
“Soviet Military Growing**) The So yuz has criticized Shevardnadze
and Gorbachev for what they feel is a lost of Soviet power. The
hard-liners not only attacked Shevardnadze, but they were very
critical of Soviet position in the Gulf crisis.
While the official Soviet position supported the U.S. led
coalition against Iraq, there were many dissenters. Some argued
that the USSR should play a mediator role so as to preserve both
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its economic interests in Iraq and its authority in the Middle 
Seat. Others thought the USSR should have abstained from voting on 
the resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq. And 
others believid that the USSR sold out its interest to try to 
please the West.(Crow 15) Some critics did not like the presence 
of U.S. led force in Iraq. The 640,000 Western military personnel 
so close to the Soviet border caused them great discomfort. A few 
Soviet officials expressed concern that some of the Western forces 
might remain in the region after the fighting was over. When the 
fighting did start many of the hard-liners were embarrassed at the 
drubbing meted out to the Soviet Union's long-time client 
Iraq.(Foye 1) The conservatives and hard-liners have made strong 
comeback in Soviet affairs, and recent events show that they have 
had a big impact on Mikhail Gorbachev.
As stated before it seems that the hard-liners have 
persuaded Gorbachev to be tougher on arms control as seemed by the 
stalled START talks and the problems over the CFE treaty. 
Gorbachev has also moved right on internal affairs. In January 
1991 Soviet tanks troops attacked Lithuanian independence 
demonstrators, leaving fifteen dead. In March Gorbachev put forth 
a resolution banning all demonstrations. There had been large 
demonstrations in Moscow calling for Gorbachev to resign.
The ban was ignored and thousands demonstrated calling for 
Gorbachev to resign. This shows the lack of power Gorbachev has. 
Gorbachev and the Soviet Union face serious problems.
Qgrbicheg faces critics from both the left and the right. His
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position has boon challenged by Russian President Boris Yeltsin. 
And his resolutions trying to regain order in the Soviet Union are 
being ignored. This is one explanation for his shift to the right, 
as attempt to regain order. The Soviet Union faces grave economic 
problems and a possible break-up of the union. The problems in the 
Soviet Union cause problems for U .S .-Soviet relations.
The United Stater, is not quite sure where Gorbachev stands. 
Is he the leader that brought democratic reform to the Soviet 
Union, helped to improve U.S.-Soviet relations, cooperated with the 
United States on the INF treaty and at first on the CFE treaty and 
START. Or has he moved to the right, trying to stop democratic 
reform and move towards authoritarian rule, and putting up 
barriers in the ratification of the CFE treaty and an agreement to 
START. The Soviet domestic problems and how they will be resolved 
will be a key in future relations. Will the United States have to 
deal, with one revised Soviet Union, IS independent republics or 
some number of independent countries in between. The United States 
will have to wait and see how the Soviet Union comes out of this 
internal crisis.
Conclusion
The U.S.-Soviet relationship since the end of World War II has 
been and continues to be extremely important, they being the two 
most powerful military powers in the world and have often not on 
ftlinily terms. The war-time alliance between the United States 
and Soviet Union, broke down soon after their common enemy, 
CHirmitiyt was defeated. The leaders of the two countries were
unable to coma to an agreement on the future of defeated Germany. 
The two countries also disagreed over the future of Eastern Europe 
and the formation of the United Nations. The United States and the 
Soviet Union had different visions of what post-war Europe should 
look like, and these visions conflicted. The different ideas of 
what Europe should look like helped lead to the disintegration of 
their relationship.
There have been some serious crises between the United States 
and the Soviet Union have come dangerously close to war: the Berlin 
Crisis in 1948 and the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962. 
Misunderstandings and different objectives in these areas led to 
the crises. But in these cases and every other crises between the 
two countries they have been able to avoid open hostilities. The 
main reason for this is the fear of war and in the latter crises 
the fear of nuclear war. But the relationship has had periods of 
friendly relations.
The detente of the early 197Us was a time of good relations 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. During this period 
they were able to make some important agreements. But again each 
side had different goals and objectives for detente which 
conflicted with the other side's goals and objectives. This helped 
lead to the breakdown of detente. The present period of U.S.- 
Soviet relations is at the highest point ever, but as mentioned 
before there are certain factors that are threatening to tear the 
relationship apart. The present period is very important, if the 
of the two countries are able to keep the reiatii^skip
51
together it could greatly reduce the threat of war. But if not the 
countries could slip back towards Cold War hostilities.
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